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THE INTERFACE BETWEEN THE BANKRUPTCY CODE 
AND A DISGORGEMENT JUDGMENT HELD BY THE  
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION 
 
KASEY T. INGRAM1 
 
 A client approaches you about filing for protection under the Bankruptcy 
Code (the “Code”).2  After determining his eligibility to file, you discover that the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (the “SEC”) plans to seek a disgorgement 
judgment against your client.3  What should you do?  
 
Guiding the debtor4 through bankruptcy requires knowing the various effects 
this disgorgement judgment could have on the bankruptcy process.5  This article 
addresses the basic actions the SEC may take against a debtor in bankruptcy.  Part I 
provides a quick review of the bankruptcy process.  Part II discusses what 
disgorgement entails.  Part III outlines the general actions the SEC takes to obtain 
and enforce a disgorgement judgment under the Code.  Part IV presents a proposal 
for subordinating the SEC’s judgment for the protection of creditors when the 
debtor is an issuer of securities.  Finally, Part V summarizes and concludes the 
material presented. 
 
                                                 
1 B.S. United States Naval Academy 1994; J.D. University of Cincinnati College of Law 2002; Judicial 
Clerk, Delaware Court of Chancery 2002-2003; Associate, Jones Day 2003-Present.  Special thanks to 
Professor Donna Nagy for her assistance on this article.  The views set forth herein are the personal 
views of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the law firm with which he is associated.   
 
2 The client will be referred to by masculine pronouns throughout this article for ease of use.  Under 
the filing requirements of the Code, the client may be an individual of either gender or a business 
entity.  11 U.S.C. § 109 lists who may qualify as a debtor under the various chapters within the Code. 
 
3 This article could also help the creditors of a bankrupt debtor with a disgorgement judgment.  As 
will be explained later, a creditor could use the arguments in this article to subordinate the SEC’s 
claim to the other creditors’ claims. 
 
4 The Code refers to the individual or entity filing for bankruptcy protection as the debtor. 
 
5In addition to seeking disgorgement, the SEC may also seek other sanctions, such as monetary 
penalties.  The U.S. Attorney may also investigate your client for criminal sanctions.  This article is 
limited to the effect of the disgorgement within bankruptcy.  If the SEC seeks further sanctions, an 
experienced securities counsel should be retained.   
32 TRANSACTIONS: THE TENNESSEE JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW [Vol. 5 
 
  
I.  The Bankruptcy Process 
 
 The United States Constitution provides for federal power to establish 
“uniform Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United States.”6  The 
first modern bankruptcy statute was the Bankruptcy Act of 1898.7  Congress 
established the current Code in 1978.8  The Code serves two major purposes.  First, 
the Code gives the debtor the opportunity to organize its debts and make a fresh 
start.9  Second, the Code ensures that similarly situated creditors are treated the same, 
which prevents creditors from racing to the courthouse to claim the residue of the 
debtor’s assets.10  The Code attempts to reconcile the somewhat conflicting interests 
of the debtor and creditor through the bankruptcy process. 
 
 There are two types of bankruptcy, liquidation or reorganization.  
Liquidation is covered by 11 U.S.C. §§ 701 et seq. (collectively, “Chapter 7”), which 
permits individuals or entities to liquidate their assets and distribute the proceeds to 
creditors.  Reorganization, on the other hand, allows individuals and entities to 
reorganize their debts and continue operations.  Individuals meeting certain financial 
requirements can file under 11 U.S.C. §§ 1301 et seq. (collectively, “Chapter 13”).  
Business entities and high-income individuals must file for reorganization under 11 
U.S.C. §§ 1101 et seq. (collectively, “Chapter 11”).  Municipalities file under 11 U.S.C. 
§§ 901 et seq. (collectively, “Chapter 9”), while farms must file under 11 U.S.C. 
§§ 1201 et seq. (collectively, “Chapter 12”).  This article will primarily focus on 
Chapters 7 and 11 because these are the predominant chapters utilized by clients 
with disgorgement problems. 
 
 Upon filing a bankruptcy petition, the debtor must list its creditors and send 
them notice of the bankruptcy petition.11  Upon receiving notice, the creditors meet 
                                                 
6 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl 4. 
 
7 See ELIZABETH WARREN, BUSINESS BANKRUPTCY 3 (Federal Judicial Center 1993). 
 
8 See id. 
 
9 See DAVID L. BUCHBINDER, FUNDAMENTALS OF BANKRUPTCY § 1.4, at 13 (Little, Brown and Co. 
1991). 
 
10 See id. 
 
11 11 U.S.C. § 342. 
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and the United States Trustee (“UST”)12 may establish committees to monitor the 
case.13  If the debtor liquidates under Chapter 7, a trustee is appointed to administer 
the estate.14  If the debtor reorganizes under Chapters 9, 11, 12, or 13, the debtor can 
carry out the duties of the trustee as a debtor-in-possession (“DIP”).15  However, a 
trustee or examiner may be appointed in a reorganization if the creditors or the UST 
ask for an appointment and the court agrees.16   
 
 After filing a bankruptcy petition, a tension develops between the debtor and 
the creditors over, among other things, what claims exist, priorities among creditors, 
assets available to creditors, and what debts will be dischargeable.17  In Parts III and 
IV, this article analyzes how the Code addresses this tension as it relates to the SEC’s 
actions to obtain a disgorgement judgment.   
  
The final step in the bankruptcy process discharges all of the debtor’s debt 
under Chapter 7,18 or confirms a plan of reorganization under Chapter 11.19  The 
                                                 
12 The U.S. Congress established the UST system nationally in 1986.  The purpose of the UST is to 
monitor the proceedings and ensure that the purposes behind the Code are met.  See generally 
BUCHBINDER, supra note 8, at §§ 10.3, 10.4.  28 U.S.C. §§ 581-589a establishes and controls the UST. 
 
13 The creditors meet with the debtor and the UST as required by 11 U.S.C. § 341, commonly known 
as the “341 meeting.”  The creditors’ committees are formed according to the provisions of each 
chapter.  Chapter 7 committees are established pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 705, while chapter 11 
committees are governed by 11 U.S.C. § 1102. 
 
14 11 U.S.C. §§ 701-704. 
 
15 11 U.S.C. § 1107 outlines the rights and duties of the DIP.  
 
16 11 U.S.C §§ 1104-1106, 1108 delineate the requirements for appointing and terminating a trustee or 
examiner, as well as the duties of the trustee or examiner.  A trustee or examiner may be appointed, or 
at least requested, in a case involving the SEC because of the potential allegations of fraud or 
inappropriate activity that caused the SEC’s involvement in the first place. 
 
17 11 U.S.C. §§ 301 et seq. (“Chapter 3”) and 11 U.S.C. §§ 501 et seq. (“Chapter 5”) delineate most of 
the provisions involving those issues.  Chapters 3 and 5 apply regardless of which chapter the debtor 
filed under for protection.  Much of the litigation in bankruptcy centers on the provisions of these 
chapters, as will be outlined further in this article. 
 
18 11 U.S.C. § 727.   
 
19 11 U.S.C. § 1129.  Chapters 9, 12, and 13 outline different requirements for confirming a plan, but 
this article will not discuss these chapters.  The general principles, however, still apply. 
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previous Bankruptcy Act of 1898 (as amended in 1938) required the SEC to review 
the plan of reorganization before confirmation.20  However, the current Code 
removed that requirement.21  The SEC may appear and be heard on any issue within 
the case,22 but may not appeal any court orders.23  In my hypothetical, however, the 
SEC will most likely qualify as a creditor and be allowed to vote on the 
reorganization plan.24   
 
 The bankruptcy process is much more complex and time intensive than the 
brief synopsis just given.  The synopsis serves as a framework to discuss specific 
issues relating to disgorgement within the context of a bankruptcy.  Before 
addressing these issues, however, Part II provides a brief overview of 
disgorgement itself. 
 
II.  Disgorgement 
 
Disgorgement is an equitable remedy that requires the wrongdoer to return 
the profits of his wrongdoing.25  The SEC uses disgorgement as its primary equitable 
remedy.26  The United States Code gives the SEC its authority to seek disgorgement 
in administrative proceedings.27  District courts grant disgorgement based upon the 
ancillary powers of the court.  The purpose of disgorgement is to discourage 
                                                 
20 See Richard E. Mendales, We Can Work It Out: The Interaction of Bankruptcy and Securities Regulation in 
the Workout Context, 46 RUTGERS L. REV. 1211, 1293-94 (1994). 
 
21 See id. at 1293-95.  Under the current system, the UST carries out many of the roles of the SEC as 
to investor protection.  Whether this actually happens or not is up to debate. 
 
22 The SEC potentially holds an interest in all cases involving investors, but realistically cannot 
participate in every case.  Therefore, the SEC focuses only on certain cases, such as those discussed in 
this article. 
 
23 11 U.S.C. § 1109. 
 
24 11 U.S.C. § 1126 governs acceptance of the plan.  To vote, one must hold a claim allowed under 11 
U.S.C. § 502.  If the SEC holds a claim under § 502, then the SEC may vote under most conditions. 
 
25 69A AM. JUR. 2D Securities Regulation – Federal § 1708 (1993). 
 
26 Ralph C. Ferrara & Philip S. Khinda, SEC Enforcement Proceedings: Strategic Considerations for When the 
Agency Comes Calling, 51 ADMIN. L. REV. 1143, 1177 (1999). 
 
27 15 U.S.C. § 78u-2(e); Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, ch. 404, tit. I, 15 U.S.C. § 21B(e); 
Securities Act of 1933, ch. 38, tit. I, 15 U.S.C. § 8A(e). 
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securities law violations, not to compensate investors for losses.28  Unfortunately, 
this principle does not always deter potential violators.29  Disgorgement also prevents 
unjust enrichment by ensuring that violators do not profit from their undeserved 
gains.30  Further, requiring the violator to return any gains, along with the headaches 
associated with a SEC investigation, will show a potential violator that the risk of 
disgorgement outweighs any possible reward.31 
 
 Disgorgement arises in various instances where securities law violators file 
for bankruptcy protection.  In the past, the SEC has sought disgorgement of illegal 
profits obtained by a broker-dealer who defrauded his customers by convincing 
them to “buy certain securities at excessive prices unrelated to prevailing market 
prices.”32  The SEC also sought disgorgement for commissions obtained in violation 
of an SEC order prohibiting a debtor’s association with brokers, dealers, registered 
investment advisers, and registered investment companies.33  Disgorgement of 
profits was also sought when a debtor used fraud and misrepresentation to fake a 
hostile takeover and force a “white knight” to purchase securities at an inflated 
price.34  Further, an illegal takeover attempt in violation of securities laws may subject 
a corporation to disgorgement.35  Although not exhaustive, these representative cases 
illustrate the myriad of situations under which the SEC will seek disgorgement. 
 
 An order for disgorgement is probably the most common and 
understandable sanction the SEC possesses.  In a bankruptcy context, however, 
disgorgement may prove difficult because the debtor most likely commingled 
legitimate and illegitimate funds.  The debtor will not reserve a stack of cash labeled 
                                                 
28 69A AM. JUR. 2D, supra note 24, at § 1708. 
 
29 Id. 
 
30 H.R. REP. NO. 101-616, at 22 (1990). 
 
31 The options available to the SEC against a securities violator include monetary penalties and referral 
to the U.S. Attorney for criminal sanctions.  These other remedies available are not discussed in this 
article, but should be reviewed if your client is facing possible sanctions from the SEC. 
 
32 SEC v. Brennan, 230 F.3d 65, 67-68 (2d Cir. 2000). 
 
33 SEC v. Telsey (In re Telsey), 144 B.R. 563, 564 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1992). 
 
34 SEC v. Bilzerian (In re Bilzerian), 153 F.3d 1278, 1280-81 (11th Cir. 1998). 
 
35 SEC v. Drexel Burnham Lambert, Inc., 956 F. Supp. 503, 504 (S.D.N.Y. 1997). 
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“ill-gotten gains” to satisfy the SEC’s judgment.  It is also important to remember 
that most debtors in bankruptcy lack sufficient assets to cover their liabilities.  
Noting this, the SEC must determine what actions it will take within the bankruptcy 
process, what protections exist to the debtor, and how the goals of bankruptcy can 
merge with the goals of disgorgement.   
 
III.  Issues Relating to Disgorgement in the Bankruptcy Context 
 
 Several factors come into play when a debtor files a petition for bankruptcy 
protection.  Upon filing for bankruptcy, the debtor receives protection via the 
automatic stay.36  Thus, the SEC must first consider how the automatic stay affects 
its case.  After discussing the automatic stay, Part III examines the actions the SEC 
must take to ensure payment of the disgorgement judgment by declaring it 
nondischargeable.   
 
Automatic Stay 
 
 The purpose of the automatic stay37 “is to grant complete, immediate, albeit 
temporary relief to the debtor from creditors, and also to prevent dissipation of the 
debtor’s assets before orderly distribution to creditors can be effected.”38  The 
automatic stay arises immediately upon filing a bankruptcy petition.  The stay acts to 
stop litigation, lien enforcement, judgment actions, and most other attempts to 
collect or enforce a collection against a debtor.39  In addition, most actions that affect 
any property of the estate or property in its custody, or any property of the debtor, 
must cease.40 
 
 Regulatory or police actions by a governmental unit are excepted from the 
automatic stay.41  This exception allows actions taken by a governmental unit in 
exercising its police or regulatory powers to continue to protect the public and 
                                                 
36 11 U.S.C. § 362. 
 
37 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(1). 
 
38 Penn Terra Ltd. v. Dep’t of Envtl. Res., 733 F.2d 267, 271 (3d Cir. 1984). 
 
39 See COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 362.01 (15th ed. 2001). 
 
40 See id.  
 
41 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(4). 
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ensure that bankruptcy is “not a haven for wrongdoers.”42  Section 362(b)(4) of the 
Code prevents a debtor from “frustrating ‘necessary governmental functions by 
seeking refuge in bankruptcy court.’”43 
 
 However, an exception within the exception exists.  Governmental units may 
not violate the stay to enforce money judgments.44  The exception exists only with 
respect to regulatory or police powers.45  Collecting a money judgment is an attempt 
to recover property of the estate outside of the normal bankruptcy process.46  Since 
an attempt to collect money lacks the immediacy of protection inherent in police or 
regulatory powers, Congress decided that a governmental unit must seek relief from 
the stay to enforce a money judgment.47 
 
 The debtor in my hypothetical case will receive the protection of the 
automatic stay upon filing its petition.  The SEC generally brings its disgorgement 
action in the United States District Court.48  The timing of the SEC’s suit vis-à-vis 
the filing of the bankruptcy petition will determine what actions the SEC may take.  
If the SEC has not obtained a judgment upon the filing of the bankruptcy petition, 
the SEC will not violate the automatic stay by continuing to seek “the entry of a 
money judgment against a debtor so long as the proceeding in which such a 
judgment is entered is one to enforce the governmental unit’s police or regulatory 
power.”49  If the SEC obtained a judgment prior to the filing of the bankruptcy 
petition, an action to enforce or collect that judgment will violate the stay.50 
                                                 
42 See COLLIER, supra note 38, ¶ 362.05[5][a] 
 
43 City of New York v. Exxon Corp., 932 F.2d 1020, 1024 (2d Cir. 1991) (quoting United States v. 
Seitles, 106 B.R. 36, 38 (S.D.N.Y. 1989)). 
 
44 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(4). 
 
45 See COLLIER, supra note 38, ¶ 362.05[5][a].   
 
46 Id.   
 
47 Id.   
 
48 See Ferrara, supra note 25, at 1176-77.  The 1990 Remedies Act may be changing this, however, since 
the SEC now possesses the ability to seek disgorgement in administrative proceedings. 
 
49 SEC v. Brennan, 230 F.3d 65, 71 (2d Cir. 2000) (emphasis in original). 
 
50 Id.   
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 In SEC v. Brennan,51 the SEC violated the automatic stay while attempting to 
collect a disgorgement judgment.  The debtor, Brennan, was a broker-dealer of low-
priced securities.52  The United States District Court for the Southern District of 
New York found Brennan liable of federal securities law violations for perpetrating a 
fraud on his customers, and ordered Brennan to disgorge approximately $75 
million.53  Before the judgment and the bankruptcy petition, Brennan established an 
offshore trust with about $5 million in assets.54  Brennan did not list the trust as 
property of the estate during his initial petition for bankruptcy.55  When confronted 
by law enforcement authorities about the trust, he amended his petition, but valued 
his interest at $0.56   
 
 The SEC alleged that Brennan maintained control of the trust, and with the 
support of the bankruptcy trustee appointed to administer Brennan’s estate, 
attempted to force Brennan to repatriate the assets so that the SEC and other 
creditors could reach them.57  The United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of 
New Jersey denied the SEC’s motion, but enjoined Brennan, with his consent, from 
transferring any assets out of the trust.58  The bankruptcy trustee then unsuccessfully 
attempted to recover the assets from the foreign nation where the trust was located.59 
 
 The SEC did not appeal the bankruptcy court’s denial of its motion.60  
Instead, the SEC filed a motion in the district court where it obtained the 
                                                 
51 230 F.3d 65 (2d Cir. 2000). 
 
52 Id. at 67. 
 
53 Id. at 68.   
 
54 Id.  
 
55 Id.  
 
56 Id.  
 
57 Id. at 68-69. 
 
58 Id. at 69. 
 
59 Id.  
 
60 Id.  
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disgorgement judgment.61  The SEC then sought to have Brennan held in civil 
contempt for not paying the disgorgement judgment and requested that the trust be 
repatriated.62  The SEC claimed that it was not attempting to collect on the 
disgorgement judgment, arguing instead that it was seeking only to account for and 
preserve the assets for the benefit of all creditors.63  The SEC recognized that it 
would only receive a pro rata share of the trust assets once repatriated.64  The United 
States District Court for the Southern District of New York ordered Brennan to 
repatriate the trust assets and to show cause why the court should not hold him in 
contempt.65   
 
 The district court granted an interim stay while Brennan appealed its order to 
the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.66  On appeal, Brennan 
contended that the order to repatriate the trust assets violated the automatic stay.67  
The Second Circuit agreed, holding that the repatriation order violated the automatic 
stay as an action to collect on a money judgment.68  The court stated that the entry of 
a money judgment cuts off the government’s police and regulatory powers.69  Thus, 
any action taken after the entry of the money judgment is seen as an attempt to 
collect that judgment, not a permissible regulatory or policy action, and is stayed 
under the money judgment exception in § 362(b)(4).70 
 
                                                 
61 Id.  
 
62 Id.  
 
63 Id.  
 
64 Id.  
 
65 Id.  
 
66 Id. at 69-70. 
 
67 Id. at 70.  Brennan also argued res judicata and violation of due process, but the Second Circuit did 
not address these arguments because it found that the order violated the automatic stay.  Id.  
 
68 Id. at 75. 
 
69 Id. at 73. 
 
70 Id. at 71.   
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 The court’s analysis focused on the regulatory aspects of the disgorgement 
judgment: 
 
When the government seeks to impose financial liability on a party, it 
is plainly acting in its police or regulatory capacity – it is attempting 
to curb certain behavior (such as defrauding investors, or polluting 
groundwater) by making the behavior that much more expensive.  It 
is this added expense that deters a party from defrauding or polluting 
– not the identity of the entity which it must eventually pay.  
Accordingly, up to the moment when liability is definitively fixed by 
entry of judgment, the government is acting in its police or regulatory 
capacity – in the public interest, it is burdening certain conduct so as 
to deter it.  However, once liability is fixed and a money judgment 
has been entered, the government necessarily acts only to vindicate 
its own interest in collecting its judgment.  Except in an indirect and 
attenuated manner, it is no longer attempting to deter wrongful 
conduct.  It is therefore no longer acting in its “police or regulatory” 
capacity….71 
 
Since the regulatory nature of the judgment disappears upon entry, the court 
reasoned that the exception to the stay ends at that time as well.   
 
This bright line rule protects the policy interests behind the automatic stay.72  
First, the rule protects the priority scheme by forcing the SEC to wait to collect its 
judgment just like other creditors.73  Second, the debtor receives both breathing 
room and time to implement an orderly distribution of its assets.74  Finally, the 
bankruptcy court centralizes all disputes and adjudicates an orderly reorganization or 
liquidation without dealing with uncoordinated actions in other courts.75 
 
                                                 
71 Id. at 72-73. 
 
72 Id. at 75. 
 
73 Id.  
 
74 Id.  
 
75 Id.  
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 According to the appellate court, the purpose behind § 362(b)(4) was not 
frustrated in this case because of the third goal delineated above.76  The SEC tried to 
get repatriation within the bankruptcy court, but failed.  Allowing the SEC to search 
for another forum to grant it the relief desired undermines the policy behind the 
automatic stay and does not further the policies behind § 362(b)(4)’s governmental 
unit exception.77  Therefore, the appellate court vacated the district court’s order 
forcing the repatriation of assets once Brennan entered the bankruptcy court as 
violating the automatic stay. 78 
 
 The lone dissenter, Judge Guido Calabresi, disagreed with the bright line rule 
stated by the majority.79  Judge Calabresi felt the district court’s order was not an 
action to enforce a money judgment.80  Further, the dissent noted that the SEC 
agreed to only take a pro rata share of the funds, thereby protecting all other 
creditors.81  In fact, Judge Calabresi correctly pointed out that Brennan was the only 
party adversely affected by the district court’s repatriation order,82  because the SEC 
agreed to make the funds available for all creditors.83  Further, Judge Calabresi 
emphasized that creditors would benefit from the availability of more assets for 
distribution.84 
 
                                                 
76 Id.  
 
77 Id.  
 
78 Id. at 76.  The holding in this case did not prevent the SEC from seeking relief from the stay.  Since 
the bankruptcy court had already denied the SEC’s first motion, the proper course for the SEC would 
have been to appeal that decision to the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey.  
The Second Circuit recognized this in its holding and admonished the SEC for failing to follow 
procedure and, instead, attempting to forum shop by filing its motion in a court it already knew as 
friendly.  Id.   
 
79 Id. at 78. 
 
80 Id.  
 
81 Id.  
 
82 Id. at 82. 
 
83 Id.  
 
84 Id.  
42 TRANSACTIONS: THE TENNESSEE JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW [Vol. 5 
 
  
Despite the dissent’s reasoned arguments and equitable position, the bright 
line rule better serves the purposes of the bankruptcy process because the same 
equitable results that the SEC desired are available through a relief from stay motion.  
The only difference between the majority and the dissent is that the majority leaves 
the decision in the hands of the bankruptcy court, while the dissent allows any court 
to carry out the same actions. 
 
 The lasting effect of this decision seems to permit SEC actions for 
disgorgement only up to the entry of judgment.  After that point, the SEC must seek 
a relief from the stay to collect on its judgment.  If the funds are commingled, the 
need to protect all creditors will likely prevent a court from granting relief.  
Therefore, the SEC will need to explore other avenues to collect its disgorgement. 
 
Dischargeability 
 
 After filing a bankruptcy petition, the general bankruptcy process requires a 
determination of the debtor’s debts and assets and an equitable distribution to the 
creditors.  After the distribution, the debtor receives a discharge from those debts.85  
Section 523(a), however, excepts certain debts from discharge.86  Thus, the debtor is 
still responsible for a nondischargeable debt even after receiving the discharge from 
the bankruptcy court. 
 
 Section 523(a) allows the filing of a motion to declare the SEC’s 
disgorgement judgment nondischargeable.  Two provisions are available, and each is 
explored separately below.  The first provision, § 523(a)(7), applies in all cases, while 
the second provision, § 523(a)(2)(A), applies only in cases involving fraud.   
 
                                                 
85 The provisions relating to discharge vary depending upon the chapter under which the debtor filed 
for bankruptcy protection.  Chapter 7 discharges the debtor under 11 U.S.C. § 727.  Chapter 11 
provides for discharge as an effect of confirmation under 11 U.S.C. § 1141. 
 
86 11 U.S.C. § 523(a).  A § 1328(a) discharge may trump portions of § 523(a).  Chapter 13 petitions, 
however, are not common with disgorgement judgments and this provision will not be explored 
further in this article. 
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§ 523(a)(7) 
 
 Section 523(a)(7) excepts from discharge any debt “to the extent such debt is 
for a fine, penalty, or forfeiture payable to and for the benefit of a governmental 
unit, and is not compensation for actual pecuniary loss.”87  Under § 523(a)(7), a 
disgorgement judgment could be treated as a monetary penalty imposed by the SEC 
for securities law violations.   
 
 In SEC v. Telsey, the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern 
District of Florida held that § 523(a)(7) applied to a disgorgement judgment.88  The 
debtor, Telsey, was barred “from associating with any broker, dealer, registered 
investment adviser or registered investment company.”89  In March 1991, the United 
States District Court for the Southern District of New York found that Telsey 
consciously violated that order.90  The court ordered Telsey to disgorge the profits he 
received as commissions in violation of the SEC order.91  Six months later, Telsey 
filed for protection under Chapter 7.92 
 
 The SEC filed a motion to except Telsey’s disgorgement order from 
discharge under § 523(a)(7) and § 523(a)(2) of the Code.93  The court granted the 
SEC’s motion, classifying the debt as nondischargeable under § 523(a)(7).  The court 
did not address the issue of whether § 523(a)(2) also excepted the debt from 
discharge.94  Both parties agreed that the debt was payable to a governmental unit 
and not compensation for a pecuniary loss.95  Therefore, the only issue was whether 
                                                 
87 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(7).   
 
88 144 B.R. 563, 565 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1992). 
 
89 Id. at 564. 
 
90 Id. at 564 n.1. 
 
91 Id. at 564. 
 
92 Id.  
 
93 Id.  
 
94 Id. at 565.  See infra p. 14 for a discussion of § 523(a)(2). 
 
95 Id. at 564 n.2.  One distinguishing factor is that the violation in this case did not create an actual 
pecuniary loss, while a fraud perpetrated on investors may qualify.  Later in the decision, however, the 
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the debt was a fine, penalty, or forfeiture under § 523(a)(7).96  The court’s decision 
focused on the deterrent effect of disgorgement.97  The slightest penal purpose 
behind an order of restitution or disgorgement will qualify the debt for 
nondischargeability under § 523(a)(7).98  The court stated that its “holding comports 
with its sense of equity, the object and policy of § 523(a)(7), and case law.  In this 
instance, Telsey is not an ‘honest but unfortunate debtor’ entitled to a discharge.”99 
 
 On the other hand, the presence of fraud implicates § 523(a)(2)(A), which 
provides an additional source of nondischargeability. 
 
§ 523(a)(2)(A) 
 
Section 523(a)(2)(A) “does not discharge an individual debtor from any 
debt … for money, property, services, or an extension, renewal, or refinancing of 
credit, to the extent obtained by false pretenses, a false representation, or actual 
fraud.”100  The issues relating to § 523(a)(2)(A) involve (1) the standing of the SEC to 
                                                                                                                                     
court cites Kelly v. Robinson, 479 U.S. 36 (1986), which held that restitution fell under § 523(a)(7).  
Telsey, 144 B.R. at 565.  The court contrasted this with an Eleventh Circuit case where restitution will 
not fall under § 523(a)(7) if solely designed to compensate the victim.  Id.  Therefore, since the 
primary purpose of disgorgement is to deter securities law violations, any disgorgement order would 
not compensate for an actual pecuniary loss.   
 
96 Id. at 564. 
 
97 Id. at 565. 
 
98 Id.  
 
99 Id.  The penal nature of disgorgement was discussed at length in SEC v. Lorin, 869 F. Supp. 1117, 
1124-25 (S.D.N.Y. 1994).  The Lorin court found disgorgement was not a penalty under 28 U.S.C. § 
2462 for purposes of determining the statute of limitations.  Recognizing this differed from the Telsey 
court, the Lorin court stated that the definition of whether an action was a fine, penalty, or forfeiture 
varied based on the statute.  Because 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(7) interpreted disgorgement much broader 
than 28 U.S.C. § 2462, disgorgement might qualify as a fine, penalty, or forfeiture under that statute 
and not under 28 U.S.C. § 2462.  Lorin, 869 F. Supp. at 1125.  
 
100 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(A).  Materially false written statements with respect to a debtor’s (or insider’s) 
financial condition are not covered by § 523(a)(2)(A).  Section 523(a)(2)(B) covers false writings, but, 
because that provision has not been raised with respect to the disgorgement actions covered in this 
article, it will not be discussed.  Most of the fraud covered by a SEC disgorgement action falls under 
SEC Rule 10b-5.  Therefore, the fraud provision of § 523(a)(2)(A) is sufficient. 
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seek nondischargeability, and (2) whether the fraud meets the requirements of fraud 
under the securities laws.   
 
Standing under § 523 
 
 The standing of the SEC relates to its position as a creditor.  Section 523(c) 
requires “the creditor to whom such debt is owed” request that the court declare a 
debt nondischargeable under § 523(a)(2).  Unless classified as a creditor, the SEC 
would lack the standing to raise the dischargeability issue under § 523(c).  Debtors 
usually argue that the SEC is not a creditor because the actual persons defrauded are 
the investors.101   
 
 A debtor successfully made this argument to the United States Bankruptcy 
Court for the Middle District of Florida.102  In SEC v. Bilzerian, the bankruptcy court 
held that the SEC lacked standing to raise the issue of nondischargeability because 
private investors maintained the right to bring a private cause of action under the 
securities laws.103  Therefore, since an individual investor could object to the 
discharge, the SEC lacked the authority to stand in that investor’s place under 
§ 523(c).104 
  
The United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Indiana 
disagreed with this reasoning.105  In SEC v. Maio, the court opposed the Bilzerian 
court’s distinction that a private cause of action removed the SEC’s standing as a 
creditor.  According to the Maio court, individual investors have different claims, 
with different elements of proof.106  Therefore, denying the SEC standing based on 
                                                 
101 See SEC v. Bilzerian (In re Bilzerian), 151 B.R. 954 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1993), reversed and remanded by 
1995 WL 934184 (M.D. Fla. May 15, 1995); see also SEC v. Maio (In re Maio), 176 B.R. 170 (Bankr. 
S.D. Ind. 1994). 
 
102 Bilzerian, 151 B.R. at  954. 
 
103 Id. at 958-59. 
 
104 Id.  
 
105 Maio, 176 B.R. at 170. 
 
106 Id. at 171-72. 
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the rights of other creditors would hinder the SEC’s ability to enforce the securities 
laws.107 
 
 Subsequent to the decision in Maio, the Bilzerian decision was reversed and 
remanded.108  On remand the court agreed with the Maio court that the bankruptcy 
court’s distinction made no difference.109  The court stated that a private cause of 
action did not remove the SEC’s ability to seek disgorgement.110  Therefore, since 
private investors can seek to deny the debtor a discharge based on § 523(a)(2), so can 
the SEC.111 
 
 These cases grant the SEC standing to dispute the dischargeability of the 
disgorgement judgment.  The next question is whether the disgorgement judgment 
based on fraud is binding in the bankruptcy court.   
 
Elements of Fraud under § 523 
 
 Because the SEC’s request to deny discharge is based on a collateral 
judgment, collateral estoppel requires identical fraud judgments based on proof of 
identical elements.112  The SEC’s disgorgement judgment cannot except that debt 
from discharge, unless the fraud upon which the disgorgement judgment was based 
satisfies the elements of fraud under § 523(a)(2)(A).  However, fraud under 
§ 523(a)(2)(A), or common law fraud, is not the same as securities law fraud.     
 
                                                 
107 Id. at 172. 
 
108 SEC v. Bilzerian (In re Bilzerian), 1995 WL 934184 (M.D. Fla. May 15, 1995).  The Bilzerian case 
spawned numerous cases relating to disgorgement judgments by the SEC in bankruptcy.  
 
109 Id. at *3. 
 
110 Id.  
 
111 Id.  
 
112 SEC v. Bilzerian (In re Bilzerian), 153 F.3d 1278, 1281 (11th Cir. 1998).  If the disgorgement 
resulted from a consent decree with the SEC, the violator typically neither admits nor denies the 
infraction.  Therefore, collateral estoppel would not apply.  See In re Cenco Inc. Sec. Litig., 529 F. 
Supp. 411, 415-16 (N.D. Ill. 1982); see also Lipsky v. Commonwealth United Corp., 551 F.2d 887 (2d 
Cir. 1976). 
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 Although not identical, most courts consider the elements of traditional 
common law fraud as the basis for fraud under § 523(a)(2)(A).113  To meet the 
elements of common law fraud required to except the debtor from discharge under 
§ 523(a)(2)(A), the “creditor must prove that: (1) the debtor made a false 
representation to deceive the creditor, (2) the creditor relied on the 
misrepresentation, (3) the reliance was justified, and (4) the creditor sustained a loss 
as a result of the misrepresentation.”114   
 
In Bilzerian, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals found that elements one 
and three above were easily met by Bilzerian’s criminal conviction for securities 
fraud.115  Consequently, only elements two and four above required further 
consideration in Bilzerian’s civil liability for securities fraud.116   
 
 Common law fraud requires proof of loss and reliance.117  Securities fraud 
cases that involve omission allow for the presumption of reliance on proof of 
materiality.118  A private cause of action under Rule 10b-5, however, requires proof 
of loss and causation.119 
 
 The Eleventh Circuit found that fraud under § 523(a)(2)(A) was essentially 
the same as securities fraud under Rule 10b-5: 
 
While some courts have not required proof of actual reliance in SEC 
enforcement actions, we nevertheless believe that the causation 
requirement of “materiality” in Rule 10b(5) satisfies the requirement 
for actual reliance necessary to apply collateral estoppel in a 
§ 523(a)(2)(A) case.  Any other decision would conflict with the 
general principles behind § 523(a)(2)(A).  This court has taken an 
                                                 
113 Id.  
 
114 Id.  
 
115 Id. at 1281-82. 
 
116 Id. at 1282. 
 
117 Id.  
 
118 See Affiliated Ute Citizens of Utah v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 153 (1972). 
 
119 Bilzerian, 153 F.3d at 1282.   
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expansive view of “debts obtained by fraud” because “the malefic 
debtor may not hoist the Bankruptcy Code as protection from the 
full consequences of fraudulent conduct.”120 
 
Thus, a bankruptcy court may not discharge the SEC’s disgorgement judgment under 
§ 523(a)(2)(A) if the violator committed fraud.121  The SEC, in fraud cases, can move 
for exception from discharge under both the fraud provision of § 523(a)(2)(A) and 
the penalty provision of § 523(a)(7) to classify the debt as nondischargeable.  
Therefore, a disgorgement judgment will likely be nondischargeable under either 
§ 523(a)(7) or § 523(a)(2)(A).  Even though a temporary stay may suspend the SEC’s 
ability to collect, the debt will remain with the debtor after other debts are 
discharged.   
 
The next step focuses on protecting the other creditors in the distribution 
process by looking at how the debt fits in the priority scheme. 
 
IV.  Equitable Subordination of Disgorgement Judgments under § 510(b) 
 
 At this point in our hypothetical debtor’s case, the automatic stay prevented 
the SEC from collecting his judgment.  The SEC, however, obtained a ruling that its 
claim was nondischargeable, and thus will survive regardless of the bankruptcy.  If 
the debtor has other debts, he must develop a plan to pay those creditors based on 
the priority scheme established within the Code.122   
 
There are four major types of claim holders: (1) secured creditors, 
(2) administrative claim holders, (3) unsecured creditors, and (4) equity holders.123  
Secured creditors are those creditors with a valid security interest in the debtor’s 
                                                 
120 Id. (quoting St. Laurent, II v. Ambrose, 991 F.2d 672, 680 (11th Cir. 1993)).  
 
121 Bilzerian also raised the argument that the disgorgement judgment constituted double jeopardy in 
violation of the United States Constitution.  Bilzerian, 153 F.3d at 1283.  The court dismissed this 
objection because a civil remedy only constitutes punishment following a criminal conviction when it 
is disproportionate or unrelated to its remedial goals.  The Eleventh Circuit held that “exception from 
discharge in bankruptcy is not an excessive fine because it is not disproportionate to the wrongful 
conduct it was designed to remedy.”  Id.  
 
122 See 11 U.S.C. §§ 506, 507. 
 
123 There are actually several more types of claims, typically involving the status of the creditor (such 
as employee, etc.) that will not be discussed in this article.   
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assets.  These claims are paid first to the extent of the value of the asset used as 
security.124  Administrative claims are paid second, and consist of debts owed after 
the filing of the petition for services rendered to preserve the estate, as well as other 
claims listed within the Code, including attorney’s fees.125  Unsecured claims, such as 
credit card debts, are paid third and include any claims for payment not secured by 
an asset.  Finally, equity security holders get paid last.  Equity security holders include 
any person or entity with an equity security interest in the debtor, such as corporate 
shareholders.126  Equity security holders incur the most risk in not getting paid, but 
enjoy an unlimited upside gain potential during corporate growth periods.127   
 
The distribution and priority scheme established by the Code exists to ensure 
similar treatment of like creditors.128  A disgorgement judgment qualifies as an 
unsecured claim because there is no special collection right associated to any specific 
property related to disgorgement.129  However, when the debtor is an issuer, the SEC 
is not like an unsecured creditor.  An unsecured creditor negotiates with the debtor 
for the loan and the repayment of a set value.  On the other hand, the SEC claims 
assets from the debtor based on violations of the securities laws.  The typical 
unsecured creditor is unaware of the legal violations a debtor may or may not 
commit.  Also, when calculating the risk of default, the typical unsecured creditor will 
not factor in the possibility of SEC intervention.  Additionally, if the SEC’s claim is 
nondischargeable, it will survive the debtor’s discharge, while the typical unsecured 
claim does not.130  Therefore, it is inaccurate to say that the SEC and the typical 
unsecured creditor are like creditors deserving equal treatment. 
 
The SEC stands in the shoes of investors who were potentially harmed by 
the debtor’s securities law violations when issuing its securities.  If those investors 
were to bring the actions individually, their claims would be based on the purchase 
                                                 
124 11 U.S.C. § 506. 
 
125 11 U.S.C. § 503. 
 
126 11 U.S.C. § 101(17). 
 
127 11 U.S.C. § 507. 
 
128 See supra note 9.   
 
129 Id.   
 
130 See supra the discussion on dischargeability.   
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or sale of a security.  The Code maintains the distribution policy that equity security 
holders have equal repayment priority to claims based on securities litigation.131   
 
Section 510(b) states: 
 
[A] claim arising from rescission of a purchase or sale of a 
security of the debtor or of an affiliate of the debtor, for 
damages arising from the purchase or sale of such a security, 
or for reimbursement or contribution allowed under section 
502 on account of such a claim, shall be subordinated to all 
claims or interests that are senior to or equal the claim or 
interest represented by such security, except that if such 
security is common stock, such claim has the same priority as 
common stock.132 
 
Section 510(b) provides for automatic subordination; it is not 
discretionary.133  The purpose behind § 510(b) is the protection of general 
creditors.134  All creditors take the risk of insolvency, but “only the security 
holders share the risks of an unlawful issuance of securities.”135  Therefore, 
the Code prevents a security holder from elevating its claim to that of an 
unsecured creditor merely through litigation when the debtor issued the 
securities.136   
 
A disgorgement judgment by the SEC should represent a claim arising from 
the purchase or sale of a security under § 510(b) when the debtor issued the 
securities.137  Several factors support this position.  First, the SEC can still collect its 
                                                 
131 11 U.S.C. § 510(b). 
 
132 Id.  
 
133 COLLIER, supra note 38, ¶ 510.04[1]. 
 
134 Id. 
 
135 Id. ¶ 510.04[2]. 
 
136 In re Cincinnati Microwave, Inc., 210 B.R. 130, 133 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1997). 
 
137 If the debtor is not an issuer of securities under § 510(b), the SEC’s disgorgement claim cannot be 
subordinated.  Additionally, subordination is not possible under the equitable subordination provision 
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judgment after the close of the bankruptcy case.  Even though there is a decreased 
probability that the SEC will recover its judgment, the probability is still higher than 
that of the unsecured creditor whose debt was completely discharged.  Second, the 
public fisc will not be depleted because the judgment reflects undeserved profits and 
not unpaid taxes.  Thus, the public fisc does not rely on receipt of the judgment, and 
a failure to receive the judgment will not cause the burden of the bankruptcy to fall 
on the public.  Third, individual investors may still maintain a private cause of action 
against the debtor.  Therefore, the individual investors can attempt to recover with 
no impediment to their suit.  Finally, in light of the third point, an individual investor 
who brings suit becomes subordinated.  Therefore, it seems equitable to allow the 
SEC to hold the same position as the investors it is protecting.   
 
 Precedent exists for extending automatic subordination under § 510(b) 
beyond the securities litigation claimants.  The United States Bankruptcy Court for 
the District of Delaware extended § 510(b) to indemnification claims by both 
underwriters, directors and officers in In re Mid-American Waste Systems, Inc.138    
 
 In Mid-American, the plaintiffs’ brought suit against Mid-American’s directors 
and officers (“D&Os”) and the securities underwriters alleging false representations 
and omissions by Mid-American in the statements it filed regarding the sale of the 
securities. 139  Just prior to the filing of the suits, Mid-American filed for Chapter 11 
bankruptcy protection.140 
 
 The D&Os and the underwriters each had indemnification agreements with 
Mid-American.141  The D&Os filed an administrative claim against Mid-American for 
                                                                                                                                     
of  § 510(c).  See United States v. Noland, 517 U.S. 535 (1996); see also United States v. Reorganized 
CF&I Fabricators of Utah, Inc., 518 U.S. 213 (1996). 
 
138 228 B.R. 816 (Bankr. D. Del. 1999);  accord In re Walnut Equip. Leasing Co., 1999 Bankr. LEXIS 
1626 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. Dec. 28, 1999); In re Jacom Computer Servs., Inc., 280 B.R. 570 (Bankr. 
S.D.N.Y. 2002). 
 
139 In re Mid-American Waste Sys., Inc., 228 B.R. at 819. The securities at issue were senior 
subordinated notes issued by Mid-American.  Id. at 818. 
 
140 Id. at 820. 
 
141 Id. at 818-20.  The D&Os were also entitled to indemnification by statute under Delaware 
corporate law. 
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indemnification with respect to the securities litigation.142  Likewise, the underwriters 
filed a general unsecured claim against Mid-American for indemnification based on 
the same suits.143  Mid-American objected to the claims on two grounds.144  First, 
Mid-American felt § 510(b) subordinated the claims.145  Alternatively, Mid-American 
wanted the claims disallowed pursuant to § 502(e)(1)(B).146  The court held that the 
claims should be subordinated pursuant to § 510(b) and, thus, did not decide 
whether § 502(e)(1)(B) applied.147 
 
 The court determined that § 510(b) applied by comparing the original statute 
with the amended version.148  Congress amended § 510(b) to make claims for 
reimbursement and contribution subject to subordination.149  The court found that 
Congress merely added new classes subject to subordination based on their 
involvement with the securities transaction.  The court stated:  
 
t]he 1984 amendment to § 510(b) is a logical extension of one 
of the rationales for the original section – because Congress 
intended the holders of securities law claims to be 
subordinated, why not also subordinate claims of other 
parties (e.g., officers and directors and underwriters) who play 
a role in the purchase and sale transactions which give rise to 
the securities law claims?  As I view it, in 1984 Congress 
made a legislative judgment that claims emanating from 
                                                 
142 Id. at 820. 
 
143 Id.  
 
144 Id.  
 
145 Id.  
 
146 Id.  
 
147 Id. at 818. 
 
148 Id. at 824.  The court actually began its analysis by determining that the D&O claims did not 
qualify as administrative expenses because the contract for indemnification occurred prepetition. Id. at 
821-23.  As this analysis is not necessary to the § 510(b) discussion, it will not be addressed. 
 
149 Id. at 826. 
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tainted securities law transactions should not have the same 
priority as the claims of general creditors of the estate.150 
 
 This rationale also applies to the SEC.  The SEC’s claim stands in the role of 
a securities law claim; therefore, it could be subordinated through an expansive view 
of § 510(b).  The decision in Mid-American presents an expansive view of § 510(b) 
that would allow the SEC to be subordinated when the debtor is the issuer of 
securities.   
 
Additionally, Mid-American holds that § 510(b) subordination should apply to 
participants in the securities transactions at issue.  The SEC oversees most securities 
transactions and participates fully in those transactions.  Without the SEC’s approval 
or consent, many transactions would not occur.   
 
A disgorgement judgment by the SEC, when § 510(b) applies to the debtor, 
varies little from an indemnification claim against the securities law violator.  The 
SEC participates in security transactions and acts as a watchdog over the securities 
markets to prevent securities law violations.  When a violation occurs, the SEC seeks, 
among other things, disgorgement of the illegal profits.   
 
A request for disgorgement deters future securities law violations.  Therefore, 
disgorgement acts as an indemnification for securities law violations in that it forces 
a violator to reimburse the SEC for losses sustained by investors for failure to 
comply with the securities laws.  Thus, subordinating an SEC disgorgement 
judgment under § 510(b) mirrors subordinating the indemnification claims of an 
underwriter, director, or officer. 
 
V.  Conclusion 
 
 Debtors with SEC disgorgement judgments against them face many obstacles 
in the administration of the bankruptcy estate.  An attorney involved in the 
administration of the estate can expect the SEC to take certain actions against the 
debtor.151 
 
                                                 
150 Id.  
 
151 Other actions not listed in this article may be taken depending on the circumstances of each case.  
All that has been presented is an overview of those actions that should occur in most cases. 
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 First, the SEC will attempt to collect its disgorgement judgment outside 
bankruptcy.  The automatic stay will allow the SEC to obtain an entry of judgment, 
but will prevent the SEC from collecting on that judgment until either a relief from 
stay is granted or the distribution plan is put into effect under the Code. 
 
 The SEC will then move to have the disgorgement judgment declared 
nondischargeable under § 523(a)(7) (governmental unit exception) or, if fraud is 
present under § 523(a)(2)(A) (fraud exception).  Typically, the SEC can successfully 
have the judgment declared nondischargeable.  Since the SEC is protected through 
its order of nondischargeability, the estate’s attorney needs to determine how to best 
protect the other creditors. 
 
 When the debtor is an issuer of securities under § 510(b), the best way to 
protect the remaining creditors is by subordinating the SEC’s judgment.  By 
recognizing the SEC’s claim as similar to a securities claim under § 510(b), the claim 
can be subordinated below the general unsecured creditors.  Therefore, more assets 
are available for the general unsecured creditors, the SEC maintains its claim outside 
bankruptcy, and the goals of both bankruptcy and disgorgement are adequately met.   
 
